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Abstract 
 
This article draws on an interview with Lord Freud, the Minister of State for Welfare 
Reform since May 2010, and explores the origins of Universal Credit and how it was 
turned over the course of five years or so from an aspirational idea into a detailed 
blueprint for change and finally into legislation in the form of the Welfare Reform Act 
2012. What emerges is an intriguing case study in British policy making. At the time of 
the interview in July 2013 the implementation of Universal Credit had just begun in a 
small number of pilot areas. Lord Freud also discusses the objectives of Universal 
Credit and when and how we will know whether these are being met. 
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Introduction  
 
David Freud must have one of the more unusual backgrounds for a senior politician in 
the UK. After retiring early from a career in investment banking he entered directly into 
the inner circles of policy making with his appointment in 2006 as adviser to the then 
Labour Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, John Hutton. He spent a second spell 
as an adviser in 2008 to a subsequent Secretary of State, James Purnell, a post he 
resigned in February 2009 to join the Conservative Party (then in Opposition). He was 
quickly made a peer in July 2009 and became a shadow welfare Minister in the Lords. 
In Opposition he helped write the policy document Get Britain Working (the blueprint for 
the Work Programme) and contributed to the 2010 Conservative Party election 
manifesto. He was appointed as Minister for Welfare Reform in the Department for 
Work and Pensions under Iain Duncan Smith as Secretary of State immediately after 
the establishment of the Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in May 
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2010, a post he has continued to hold through two reshuffles, most recently in 
September 2013. He is the Government Minister with responsibility for the 
implementation of Universal Credit. 
 
In the spring of 2013 Universal Credit had entered its initial phase of piloting whilst plans 
for the national rollout continued to be made. As a contribution to this Special Issue the 
Minister who has held the brief for introducing Universal Credit Lord Freud, agreed to be 
interviewed about the how aspirational ideas about simplifying the benefit system were 
transformed into Universal Credit and about the early days of piloting the new scheme. I 
met Lord Freud in his office in Whitehall on 2 July 2013 and digitally recorded our 
conversation. The extracts that appear in this article have been edited only minimally to 
remove the usual ‘ers’ and ‘ums’.   
 
What emerged in the course of the interview was a story of how policy making happens 
in modern government and the sheer volume of work that goes into it, and a picture of 
Universal Credit not as a fully and perfectly formed piece of social policy but more as an 
organic policy deliberately designed to allow it to be changed in order to meet its 
ambitious objectives.  
 
  
Universal Credit – the first steps 
 
The roots of Universal Credit can be found in Reducing dependency, increasing 
opportunity (DWP 2007), known as the Freud Report, produced when David Freud was 
an advisor to John Hutton. That report was produced to a very tight timetable and could 
not, he recognises, do everything. 
 
‘I had a matter of weeks to write a report on the welfare system….  I concentrated in 
that report on how to reform the welfare to work system and on how to tackle the real 
problem, which was not unemployment but inactivity, and a culture of inactivity. A third 
area, which I did not have a chance to consider in detail, was the benefit system which 
did not have the right incentive structures, so I wrote a short piece on trying to find 
something with the right incentive structures. I said there should be a Commission on 
the benefit system itself. I could see there was a huge problem here but I couldn’t solve 
it in a matter of weeks. I thought a single system was the way to go …. but a 
Commission was my solution.’ 
 
The idea of a Commission to look into the benefits system did not find favour with the 
government, however, and he detected a lack of political support from the top. Although 
radical benefit reform was discussed as a possible way forward in Labour government 
policy documents in the years following the Freud Report (DWP 2008; 2009) it was the 
think tank the Centre for Social Justice, and in particular  its Director Stephen Brien, that 
took the idea of benefit reform further forward.  
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‘The only people who took up that challenge was Iain Duncan Smith in the Centre for 
Social Justice. And he employed Stephen Brien to write a report. Stephen said “we took 
up that challenge. We saw that was the hole and we decided to take up that challenge.’ 
 
 
Serendipitous policy making – from an idea to fruition 
 
The account that David Freud gives of what happened between then and the passage 
of the Welfare Reform Act in 2012 provides a rare insight into policy making in the UK 
and the roles played by not only political will but also chance and good fortune. 
 
In the summer of 2009 the Centre for Social Justice published Dynamic Benefits, a 
radical plan to reform not just the benefits system but also the system of in-work tax 
credits (Centre for Social Justice 2009). Freud had found the key to tackling the part of 
the welfare system that he had not had space and time to develop in Reducing 
Dependency. 
 
‘For the first time, I saw a way structurally of having one benefit but having it sensitive to 
the individual, and having this idea of the taper to tie over between the benefit system 
and the tax credit system. That was where it was clever. You could never have invented 
Universal Credit in terms of affording it, unless you already had a tax credit system, 
which was inefficient. But the money was there, and you could tune it into Universal 
Credit.’ 
  
The task then began of turning the idea of a combined benefit and tax credit system into 
the reality of a workable policy. Freud described how, over the winter of 2009/2010, he 
tackled a number of different challenges. The first was political. 
 
‘What I had to do was make it politically acceptable and workable. My own view is, 
when you’ve got something like this, you cannot have it being politically contentious and 
whatever the shouting and yelling round the edges, it is basically not politically 
contentious. It is something that I would be most surprised if any future government, of 
any complexion, doesn’t go on running with.’ 
 
One decision that was taken was to exclude Disability Living Allowance (DLA) from 
Universal Credit, recognising that DLA, as a non-means-tested benefit, had a different 
logic from out-of-work benefits such as Jobseeker’s Allowance and Income Support: 
 
‘…there was a very strong argument to say that you needed the same amount of money 
to deal with a particular condition, regardless of your income .…and [incorporating DLA] 
would have been hugely resisted by the disability lobby. And I think when you are 
bringing in something new you have to have enough sensitivity to the key lobbies to do 
something that goes with the grain.’ 
 
Another challenge that almost stopped the whole project was initially technical but later 
turned into a political problem. It was recognised that Universal Credit would need a 
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totally new IT system, and that without up-to-date and accurate information about 
people’s earnings it could take a long time to introduce.  
 
‘…we talked to people who knew how the different systems worked - in HMRC [Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs] in the Tax Credits and in DWP [Department for Work 
and Pensions] for the benefit system. And we were told this is a fabulous idea, you need 
to do it and it will take you eight years to introduce, to build a new system.  
 
This timeframe appeared to put the whole project at risk but, in what Lord Freud called 
‘a story of serendipity’, hope was restored following his discovery that four years of the 
work had effectively already been done.  
 
‘…(a commercial organisation) had just spent the last four years building for HMRC, a 
real time system of PAYE. So clearly, I realised pretty fast that if we could get a feed of 
people’s earnings on a monthly basis, we could have a live system which was 
responsive to people’s real needs every month and that, of course, was the huge 
problem of any single benefit system …you just have to have that information. I had not 
realised that they had done four years’ work. Four years’ work takes four years out of 
your eight. So suddenly we had a potential way of doing this…’ 
 
Lord Freud explained that the planning was too embryonic to allow for public 
announcements at that stage. 
 
‘There were just too many loose ends going around to open up what was a massive 
new thing - basically a re-build of the tax system and a re-build of the benefit system in 
one. But I got going on designing what we had to do to introduce it.’ 
 
The pace of development changed gear after the general election in May 2010.  
 
‘It was then essentially a race against time, and has been ever since. I didn’t realise 
when you start quite how every day matters. We had until late July to get a Green 
Paper1 out saying what our plans were. Which we did. In that process we had to 
persuade the Prime Minister, or explain to the Prime Minister, and others how the 
electronic system would work. Bring government on board with it. So astonishingly little 
time to do that. Every day mattered. Then you swing from that into producing a White 
Paper, which we did in the Autumn.2 And then straight into a Bill.’ 
 
After its publication in February 2011 the Welfare Reform Bill began its parliamentary 
passage.  
 
‘The Bill takes all year and is the most astonishingly hard work. I think in the summer I 
had to spend 75 hours in Committee and report stage, and the interesting thing about 
the process was … how orientated around the Lords it actually was. I think there was 
one change in the Welfare Bill done in the Commons stages, but I must have made 30 
                                                          
1
 21st Century Welfare (DWP 2010a). 
2
 Universal Credit. Welfare that Work (DWP 2010b). 
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changes or commitments to get it through the Lords’ processes. Because there is no 
majority in the Lords you have to carry enough Cross Benchers to get things through. At 
the beginning of every week of the Committee stage, we would have a session. We 
would go through it with the interested Peers, the Opposition, cross Benchers, exactly 
what we are trying to do, so we didn’t spend a whole lot of time with someone waving 
the wrong end of the stick vigorously. You know people knew what the issue was, 
focused on it. We could address it. So it was argued through very thoroughly. Quite a lot 
of very good ideas from the Lords, including from the Opposition, which we 
incorporated. I think that that’s a testament to what you can do in the Lords and the 
seriousness which Peers take to concentrate on issues and the value that they can 
add.’ 
 
After the Welfare Reform Act was passed in early 2012 the task of compiling a new set 
of regulations began.  
 
’This was an immense labour for the Department and the risk in that period was that we 
just took the existing system, carbuncles and all, and just imported it over - so we took 
the opportunity to really have a hack at big areas of it… trying to get a simplified system; 
so the actual regulations I think are a quarter, if that, of the regulations they replace. 
And that was a huge labour. And then the final element was to get them to SSAC3 and 
SSAC did an extraordinary job. We adopted most of what they said.’ 
 
He concludes his account by summing up: 
 
‘We actually had a good process. We had built the structure of the system.’ 
 
 
Putting Universal Credit into practice 
 
At the time of our conversation in early July the implementation of Universal Credit had 
entered only its most early stages of being piloted in one area of the North West, 
Ashton-under-Lyne. Although it was clearly early days, I asked Lord Freud when and 
how we will know whether Universal Credit could be considered a success. He 
answered initially with a note of caution. His view was that Universal Credit was such a 
huge policy change that it could not be fully tested in advance. It had to be introduced 
gradually and improved as and when necessary. 
 
‘…you can’t test that, you’ve got to do UC and then you find out… But I think we will 
start off with a system, with an architecture which is OK, but an architecture which 
allows you to (a) optimise what you’ve got and (this will take you 20 years plus) keep 
the system moving with society, because if you are constantly testing all the parameters 
of it, you can keep it rolling, and we have never had an architecture like that before.’ 
 
                                                          
3
 SSAC is the Social Security Advisory Committee, the statutory body whose remit is to scrutinise most social 
security secondary legislation and make recommendations to the Secretary of State. 
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To enable Universal Credit to be responsive to new demands or priorities, there is 
provision within the legislation to allow DWP to vary some of the parameters (for 
example, the levels of the earnings disregards,4 or the conditionality and sanctions 
imposed on claimants) in local areas. Another parameter, the level of the taper at which 
benefit is withdrawn as income from wages rises, is one that Lord Freud wants to 
explore further in these experiments. In Dynamic Benefits, a taper rate of 55 per cent 
was recommended in order that claimants would experience a sharp rise in their income 
if they moved into work from benefits. However, the eventual taper implemented in 2013 
was 65 per cent - a decision based at the time on affordability. Lord Freud did not 
express disappointment at this, recognising that he at least had the opportunity of 
experimenting with different rates in different parts of the country in the coming years. 
 
Although he recognised the power of randomised controlled trials in evaluating the 
impact of Universal Credit experiments, he also acknowledged that what he called ‘pure 
RCT’ was probably not feasible. However, he was enthusiastic that the large data sets 
(of management information) that would naturally be built up in the course of 
implementing Universal Credit would enable him to use other, quasi-experimental 
techniques to measure impacts. 
 
‘… in Universal Credit  it could be almost free to collect what happened to all these 
people. We should have it on the records; we have their earnings, were they in work, 
what is the pattern. It could almost be a free resource. Almost. So the only cost is 
setting up the people to do the different thing, watching what happens to them 
afterwards, free. So we can start thinking in terms of tens, hundreds, even thousands, of 
experiments.’ 
 
We talked about the expectations that Universal Credit will encourage more people 
back to work. I asked whether Universal Credit could ever be a major driver behind 
reducing unemployment, in comparison with other DWP policy levers, such as the Work 
Programme. In response, Lord Freud expressed his confidence that Universal Credit 
would remove some of the ‘fear’ about trying employment or moving into a new job. He 
referred to internal DWP projections that suggested that as many as 300,000 extra 
families would have someone in employment in ‘the early stages’ and that this would be 
an independent effect of the new benefit system. 
 
‘An element of it is simplicity, lack of fear, just the fact that I can do a bit of work but if I 
fail I don’t have to reclaim to get back on my benefits. That’s a removal of barriers to 
taking risk. My own view is I think we’ve under-egged that hugely. I think that’s going to 
be a major attraction for people, particularly for people who have got fluctuating 
disabilities. I think that is going to completely transform their attitude to doing a bit of 
work.’ 
 
Lord Freud was keen to return to one of his key aims from six years earlier when he first 
became involved in welfare reform – to reduce inactivity. Even without Universal Credit 
                                                          
4
 I learned in the course of the interview that disregards had acquired a new name under Universal Credit. The new 
term is ‘work allowances’. 
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he argued that government policy was having an impact by reducing the number of 
people on inactive benefits such as Incapacity Benefit and Income Support. He referred 
to two principal measures that had produced these effects – the reduction in the ages of 
children of lone parents that entitles them to Income Support and the reassessment of 
claimants on Incapacity Benefit. Both measures have produced a transfer of claimants 
from these inactive benefits on to active benefits.5 
  
‘…we have roughly reduced inactivity by about half a million. That has been a massive 
move. Look at the contrast with what’s happened in America in the period. We used to 
level peg with America on employment figures. Today we are roughly 71.5% in work 
and America is down at 67% and their unemployment rate is better than ours, so they 
have seen inactivity go through the roof. And that has been in a time of the worst 
recession that we have ever seen. The current figures actually suggest that the 
recession in 2008/09 was probably worse than the 1930s. To have got through that 
recession without seeing disability go up half a million, which is the kind of figure you 
would expect in the 80s and 90s, but actually see it going the other way, is a remarkable 
achievement.’  
 
I returned to the question of how we will know whether Universal Credit is working. 
What might be achieved by the next election in 2015? Lord Freud readily admitted the 
difficulties in measuring impacts. 
 
‘The trouble is the statistics are hard to use and getting harder. They come out in 
arrears. There’s all kind of rules about when we can use them, so I’d like to feel we 
have a feel for it by the election. I think we will be able to have a much clearer idea of 
the poverty impacts. Just because we know where the money is gone. And that’s going 
to be much easier to measure. It’s always harder to measure the behavioural 
responses. I think it will take a little time to know the outcomes.’ 
 
As our interview approached its end Lord Freud re-stated the overriding aim of 
Universal Credit – to change people’s thinking about benefits and working and 
ultimately to change their behaviour.  
 
‘I think what we want is a system that doesn’t act as a barrier to people in being 
independent and running their own lives. I also want a system where people know what 
will happen if they change their behaviours or if they do something. I think the worst 
thing about the existing system is a lot of people know very well exactly where they 
stand if they stay exactly in the same place with the same circumstances. They haven’t 
got a clue what would happen if they do something, take a job or something, and that 
actually, because the system is so complicated, and that stops people from doing 
anything and that I think is really dangerous not just for economic reasons, but for 
health reasons. Because I think if you take people’s freedom of action … freedom away, 
freedom to change and try things, and you make them dependent in that way, which is 
what you are doing, you make them ill.  I am following the theories of Aaron Antonovsky 
who says that people are healthy when they are resilient and understand what is 
happening round them, to them; they have control. So giving people back control of 
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their lives is something that will be hugely beneficial to people, to their physical and 
mental health, and their basic happiness and I think that is almost the most important 
thing about having a nice, comprehensible, simple, straightforward, personal benefit 
system.’ 
And reiterating a point made earlier, that Universal Credit would develop and change in 
the light of increasing understanding about its effects, Lord Freud concluded the 
interview with his view of the future: 
 
‘This is just the beginning…. Universal Credit will roll and roll.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
1 21st Century Welfare (DWP 2010a). 
 
2 Universal Credit: welfare that works (DWP 2010b). 
 
3 SSAC is the Social Security Advisory Committee, the statutory body whose remit is to 
scrutinise most social security secondary legislation and make recommendations to the 
Secretary of State. 
 
4 I learned in the course of the interview that disregards had acquired a new name 
under Universal Credit. The new term is ‘work allowances’. 
 
5 Economically inactive people are not in work and do not meet the internationally 
agreed definition of unemployment. They are people without a job who have not actively 
sought work in the last four weeks and/or are not available to start work in the next two 
weeks. Benefits for economically inactive people include long-term sickness benefits 
(such as Employment and Support Allowance) and Income Support. In contrast 
Jobseekers Allowance is paid to people deemed capable and immediately available for 
work. 
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